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1Abstract
I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing
for general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy local versions of the
standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function
conditions, a ￿rst-order approach is justi￿ed. Under the same conditions, informativeness and
riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agent￿ s informational
rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts
are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is
always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.
JEL Classi￿cation: D82, D83, L51
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Stochastic
Ordering, Value of Information
21 Introduction
A vast literature on contracting and mechanism design has investigated the consequences of asym-
metric information on the e¢ ciency and distributive properties of allocations. In most of this
literature the model￿ s primitive is an information structure. However, in some economic problems
it is reasonable to assume that economic agents do only possess information because they expect
to make use of it. Moreover, their e⁄ort to gather information is often unobservable to others.
Thus, an information acquisition technology rather than the information structure itself should be
taken as the model￿ s primitive, and contracts serve the double role of motivating the acquisition
of information and ensuring its truthful revelation. How does this second role a⁄ect the nature of
optimal screening contracts?
Since Demski and Sappington (1987) have raised this question, many investigations have fol-
lowed. Notably, a prominent literature has investigated how optimal supply arrangements in pro-
curement should be changed to account for costs of acquiring information about cost-of-production
conditions (see, e.g., CrØmer and Khalil (1992), CrØmer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a,b), Lewis and
Sappington (1997), Sobel (1993), and La⁄ont and Martimort (2002) for a survey of these models).
More recently, I myself (Szalay (2005)) have analyzed how decision-making in an advisor-advisee
relationship should be structured to guarantee high quality advice.
The ￿ndings of this literature are as follows. If the buyer in the procurement context wants
to make sure the seller is well informed, then he should o⁄er ￿high powered￿incentive contracts.
Compared to a supply arrangement with a seller who is already well informed about his costs, the
seller will bene￿t from an unusually high order if his marginal costs are lower than expected, but
he will also receive an exceptionally low order if his costs are higher than ex ante expected. As
a result, the quantity supplied is discontinuous and drops sharply when the seller￿ s cost is higher
than ex ante expected. If the buyer does not want the seller to become informed, then the supply
arrangement should be rigid and should make little use of the seller￿ s information. Both cases can
occur, depending on the cost of information acquisition and the timing of events.1 The structure of
decision-making in Szalay￿ s (2005) model of advice displays an exaggeration property that is akin
to a high powered incentive contract. If the advisor recommends an action that is higher than the
1This result depends on the absence of competition. Compte and Jehiel (2002) reinvestigate the case studied by
CrØmer et al. (1998b) allowing many agents to compete. While CrØmer et al. (1998b) showed that information
acquisition is socially wasteful, Compte and Jehiel (2002) show that it may become desirable again when agents
compete.
3ex ante expected action then the advisee takes an action that is even higher than the recommended
one; if the advisor￿ s proposed action is lower than the ex ante expected one, then the advisee takes
an even lower action. Similar to the procurement case, the decision schedule is discontinuous and
increases sharply at the prior mean.
Information acquisition in all these papers is of an all-or-nothing nature, where the person who
acquires information is in equilibrium either completely informed or does not receive additional
information at all. I raise a simple question: how do the insights of this literature depend on this
simpli￿cation?
I ￿nd that super powered incentive contracts and exaggeration are general features of contracts
with endogenous information, discontinuities are not. To demonstrate these ￿ndings, I develop
a general but still tractable model of information acquisition. Since the techniques I use can be
applied to a wide class of problems with endogenous information, the model is of interest well
beyond the context of procurement and the speci￿c question I raise.
I study the procurement problem that CrØmer et al. (1998a) have analyzed. A buyer wishes
to obtain parts from a seller. Neither the seller nor the buyer knows ex ante how costly it is to
produce these parts, say because they both engage in this particular kind of activity for the ￿rst
time. The buyer begins by o⁄ering a menu of contracts to the seller. Before the seller has to
accept or reject o⁄ers he can acquire information about his costs. In contrast to CrØmer et al.
(1998a), the seller can exert a continuous choice of e⁄ort and receive a continuum of noisy signals.
An increase in the seller￿ s e⁄ort improves the quality of the signal he receives stochastically. Both
the seller￿ s choice of e⁄ort and the signal he receives are known only to him but not to the buyer.
After the seller has observed a signal he either accepts one of the contracts or walks away without
further sanction. The seller learns the true cost of production only when he produces.
Allowing for a continuous quality of noisy information introduces considerable technical di¢ cul-
ties, and one of the contributions of this paper is to demonstrate an elegant way over these hurdles.
A rich model of information acquisition leads naturally into a problem of multi-dimensional screen-
ing. Ex post, when the seller has acquired a noisy signal, his entire posterior, a multi-dimensional
object, may be relevant for contracting. Thus, the buyer faces a problem of multi-dimensional
screening, which is potentially quite nasty to solve2. However, when the seller￿ s utility is linear
in his information variable (e.g., his constant marginal costs), then the seller￿ s preference over
2See McAfee and McMillan (1988) for a screening problem where types have more dimensions than the principal
has screening instruments available. See also Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Rochet and Stole (2003) for
overviews of multidimensional screening problems.
4contracts depends e⁄ectively only on the mean calculated from the posterior distribution. Since
this is a one dimensional statistic, the problem at the reporting stage is reduced to the well known
one-dimensional screening problem. To understand the seller￿ s ex ante problem of how much e⁄ort
to invest in information acquisition, one has to study the dependence of the ex ante distribution
of the conditional expectation on e⁄ort. One can resort to standard di⁄erentiability methods to
describe the optimal amount of e⁄ort spent on information acquisition only if the seller￿ s e⁄ort
in￿ uences the ex ante distribution of the conditional mean in a particular way. The seller￿ s optimal
choice of information acquisition is adequately described by a ￿rst-order condition for any con-
tract that ensures truthful communication of information, if and only if the seller￿ s e⁄ort increases
the riskiness of the ex ante distribution of the posterior expectation at a decreasing rate, where
riskiness is understood in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).3
The second contribution of this paper is to provide statistical foundations for increasing risk in
the distribution of conditional expectation in terms of the primitives of the experiment structures.
I obtain an in￿ uence of the desired sort when I impose two assumptions. First, the marginal
distributions of signals and true costs are given and the sellers e⁄ort in￿ uences only the joint
distribution of these two variables.4 Second, an increase in e⁄ort increases the posterior for signals
above the prior expected signal value in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD),
and the posterior satis￿es the Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC). For
signals below the prior expected signal, an increase in e⁄ort decreases the posterior in the sense of
FOSD and the posterior satis￿es the Concavity of the Distribution Function Condition.
It is interesting to contrast these conditions with those used to justify the traditional ￿￿rst-order
approach￿in problems of pure moral hazard (Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988)). My conditions
are local versions of the standard FOSD and CDFC conditions. I impose local rather than the
usual global conditions, because the latter imply changing means (Milgrom (1981)), which is a
rather undesirable feature of a model of information acquisition; the law of iterated expectations
requires that the means be independent of the amount of information acquisition. My conditions
3Note that this notion of riskiness is somewhat di⁄erent from Blackwell￿ s, which states that one information
structure is Blackwell-better than another if it gives rise to a more risky distribution of the posterior. Riskiness of
the posterior expectation is a less restricting condition. Heuristically, while Blackwell requires the distribution of all
moments to be more risky, the present concept requires only that the distribution of the ￿rst moment is more risky.
The di⁄erence arises because I impose restrictions on the seller￿ s utility function, while Blackwell￿ s criterion orders
information structures for all decision makers whose utility function belongs to a class. For more recent approaches
that order information structures, see Karlin and Rubin (1956), Lehmann (1988), and Athey and Levin (2001).
4A statistical structure of essentially this type is called a copula (see, e.g. Nelsen (2006))).
5are less restrictive than the ones used to justify the traditional ￿rst order approach. In problems
of pure moral hazard one has to ensure the monotonicity of contracts by imposing in addition
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), which makes the speci￿cation overall rather
restrictive. In contrast, there is no need to ensure the monotonicity of contracts when there is
adverse selection, because monotonicity of contracts is a necessary condition for implementability
(Guesnerie and La⁄ont (1984)). Therefore, it is fair to say that the ￿rst-order approach goes
through more easily than in a problem of pure moral hazard.
A second statistical model that delivers the same reduced form is a stochastic experiment
structure that is similar in nature to the spanning condition studied in Grossman and Hart (1983).
In that speci￿cation, an experiment is the realization of two independent random variables; a signal
which follows a given marginal distribution and an informativeness parameter whose distribution
depends on the agent￿ s e⁄ort. The posterior satis￿es a local version of MLRP; for signals above
the mean, a posterior arising from a relatively more informative experiment places relatively more
weight on the high realization of costs, for signals below the mean, it places relatively more weight
on the low realizations of costs. Finally, an increase in e⁄ort makes it more likely to observe a more
informative experiment in the sense of FOSD, and the distribution of informativeness satis￿es a
CDFC condition.
The main insight arising from this analysis is that informativeness and risk are equivalent in any
tractable model. It is in fact this equivalence result that explains the ￿ndings of the literature on
the value of information and the structure of optimal contracts. The value of information depends
on the seller￿ s and the buyer￿ s attitudes towards risk, that is, the shape of their indirect utility
functions. It is well known that only convex indirect utility pro￿les of the seller are implementable
(see Rochet (1985)). Thus, incentive compatibility makes the seller a quasi-risk lover so that he
always likes to have more information. In contrast, the shape of the buyer￿ s indirect utility function
is a more complex issue. It depends both on his direct utility function and the distribution of types.
More information can either be a blessing or a curse to the buyer5, and I provide su¢ cient conditions
for both cases. Similarly, the structure of the optimal supply arrangement is more risky than its
exogenous information counterpart when the buyer provides the seller with extra incentives for
information acquisition, and is less risky when the buyer reduces the seller￿ s incentives to acquire
information. In the former case, when the seller￿ s expected cost is surprisingly low he is rewarded
by an extra increase in production that increases his informational rent at the margin, and punished
5This con￿rms results of Green and Stokey (1981), who do, however, not relate their results to risk.
6if his expected cost is surprisingly high. These results con￿rm and generalize those of CrØmer et
al. (1998a) and eliminate the undesirable discontinuity in their supply arrangement due to the
all-or-nothing nature of information acquisition. But the analysis is of use beyond that context
and can be applied to any model that relies on a linear environment.
Ordering better information by riskiness in the distribution of conditional expectations is an
extremely useful concept. In contemporaneous work Dai and Lewis (2005) have studied a model
of sequential screening with two possible levels of precision of information that obey this ordering.
They show that experts with di⁄erentially precise information can be screened by the extent of
decision authority embodied in contracts. As in the present paper, the value of information to the
principal is ambiguous. However, they show that this ambiguity can be overcome by varying the
timing structure of the interaction between the principal and the expert. Dai and Lewis (2005)
and the present paper complement each other. While their aim is to develop a model that is
easily tractable, the current paper provides general statistical foundations for the reduced form
they employ and thereby con￿rms the generality of their ￿ndings. Moreover, the justi￿cation of
the ￿rst-order approach in terms of the primitives of the experiment structure is a novelty of my
model. More recently, Shi (2006) has studied information acquisition in optimal auctions showing
how the optimal reserve price is a⁄ected by the fact that information is endogenous. Shi studies
information structures that are ￿rotation ordered￿ , a concept that Johnson and Myatt (2006) have
used to study general transformations of demand. The information structures used in this paper
satisfy the rotation order. In contrast to Shi (2006), this paper derives more general statistical
foundations in terms of experiment structures that induce the desired ordering in the ex ante
distribution of conditional expectations.
Closest related to the present paper in terms of its aim to uncover the general principles of
information acquisition are Gromb and Martimort (2004) and Malcomson (2004). Gromb and
Martimort (2004) establish the Principle of Incentives for Expertise, according to which an agent
should be rewarded when his advice is con￿rmed either by the facts or by the advice of other
agents. There are two main di⁄erences to the present paper. First, their setup is simpler on the
informational side but richer on the organizational side, in that they allow for multiple agents.
Second, they allow for contracting contingent on advice and ex post realizations whereas I focus
on the case where the agent￿ s information is not veri￿able ex post. Malcomson (2004) analyzes the
standard principal agent problem, where the agent not only exerts some e⁄ort but also makes a
decision. The main di⁄erence to the present paper is the role of communication. I allow for com-
7munication while Malcomson considers the case where the principal commits to a single contract
in advance. Moreover, Malcomson￿ s main interest is in characterizing conditions under which the
addition of the agent acquiring a signal makes the problem and its solution any di⁄erent from the
standard principal agent problem, and its solution, respectively. In contrast, the present approach
allows for a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism.
Bergemann and V￿lim￿ki (2002) analyze incentives for information acquisition in ex post e¢ -
cient mechanisms. They show that incentives for information acquisition in a private value envi-
ronment are related to supermodularity in the agents￿payo⁄functions.6 In contrast to the present
paper contracts are only proposed after information has been acquired. As a result, information
acquisition may be either excessive or insu¢ cient although the seller￿ s payo⁄function in the present
model is submodular in the state and the contracting variable.
The information structures used in the present paper connect the contracting literature to
a literature on the value of information in decision problems, a line of research that has been
initiated by Blackwell (1951), and Karlin and Rubin (1956), and further pursued by Lehmann
(1988), and most recently by Athey and Levin (2001). The combination of these two literatures
delivers a powerful approach, that should prove useful to study further applications, because the
predictions of the model are robust within a large class of information gathering technologies. One
such application, already pursued by Shi (2006), is the study of optimal auctions with endogenous
information (see Myerson (1981) for the case of exogenous information). His approach nicely
complements the literature on auctions with endogenous information that has restricted attention
to a class of mechanisms, e.g., ￿rst versus second price auctions (see Tan (1992), Hausch and Li
(1993), Stegemann (1996), and more recently Persico (2000) on this).7
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 contain the main theory. In section 2 I spell
out the main model. Section 3 contains the main result on the validity of the ￿rst-order approach.
Section 4 derives the statistical foundation of the second order stochastic dominance relation in
the distribution of the conditional expectation. Sections 5 and 6 contain the main implications of
the theory. Section 5 derives some results on the value of information, section 6 discusses the form
of optimal contracts. Section 7 derives two alternative formulations of experiments. In the ￿rst
variation, I allow for moving supports, and show that the ￿rst-order approach is typically not valid
in this framework but would deliver - if valid- essentially the same structural predictions except
6They note that e¢ cient mechanisms in the linear environment can be based on conditional expectations.
7Persico￿ s result that the auction format with the higher risk sensitivity induces more information acquisition
corresponds to the result that the marginal value of information for the agent is positive.
8for distortions at the top. The second variation provides a particularly useful simpli￿cation of the
main model which I term stochastic experiment structures. Section 8 concludes. Long proofs are
in the appendix.
2 The Model
The model is a variant of the Baron and Myerson (1982) model where I allow for general, endoge-
nous information structures. A buyer (henceforth the principal) contracts with a seller (henceforth
the agent) for the production of a good. The good is divisible, so output can be produced in
any quantity, q: q is observable and contractible. The agent receives a monetary transfer t from
the principal and has costs of producing the quantity q equal to ￿q. Both parties are risk neu-
tral with respect to transfers. The principal derives gross surplus V (q) from consumption; where
V (q) is de￿ned on [0;1) and satis￿es the conditions8 Vq (q) > 0; Vqq (q) < 0; limq!0 Vq (q) =
1; limq!1 Vq (q) = 0: Thus the principal￿ s net utility is
V (q) ￿ t
The agent￿ s payo⁄ from receiving the transfer t and producing the amount q is given as
t ￿ ￿q
Ex ante the principal and the agent do not know the precise value of ￿; but share a common
prior about it, which is supported on
￿
￿;￿
￿
with cdf P (￿); where ￿ > 0: Once the principal has
committed himself to the terms of the contract but before production takes place, the agent may
acquire additional information about ￿: Information acquisition is modeled as a costly choice of
e⁄ort e, that in￿ uences the informativeness of certain experiments.
An experiment is a joint distribution of ￿ and and a random variable ￿:This distribution
depends on the agent￿ s e⁄ort. The marginal distributions of ￿ and ￿ are both independent of
e; so e⁄ort in￿ uences only the joint distribution of the two variables (so roughly speaking the
correlation between the two variables) but not their marginal distributions9. The random variable
￿ has typical realization ￿ 2 [￿;￿]; and follows a distribution with an arbitrary density k(￿) > 08￿
and cdf K (￿): Since the distribution of ￿ has full support, K (￿), contains the same information
8Throughout the paper subscripts will denote derivatives of functions with respect to their argument.
9The assumption that the marginal of ￿ is independent of e will be important for the results in sections 4 through
6, but is not needed for the results in section 3. Since the changes to incorporate the case where the marginal of ￿
depends on e are minor, I leave it to the reader to explore this extension.
9as ￿ does itself, but is much more convenient to work with. So, I denote the random variable
S = K (￿) as the signal. As is well known, S is distributed on a support [s;s] = [0;1] and follows
a uniform distribution, regardless of the function K (￿).10
I let H (￿js;e) denote the resulting posterior cdf and let h(￿js;e) denote the density of the
posterior distribution, and assume that this density is di⁄erentiable in s and e to the order needed.
Experiments can be ordered in the sense that high values of s indicate high costs in the sense of
First Order Stochastic Dominance
￿1 < Hs (￿ js;e) < 08e (1)
(1) implies that
R ￿
￿ ￿dH (￿js;e) is increasing in s with a bounded rate of change: Below I will also
introduce a precise sense in which higher e⁄ort corresponds to more informative experiments. For
the time being this is not important and the only restriction I impose on the in￿ uence of e⁄ort on
H (￿js;e) is
He (￿js;e) = He (￿js;e) = 0 (2)
(1) and (2) imply that there is a lowest and a highest estimate of costs conditional on the agent￿ s
information and these bounds are both independent of the level of e⁄ort the agent exerts. For-
mally,
R ￿
￿ ￿dHe (￿js;e) =
R ￿
￿ ￿dHe (￿js;e) = 0: This property is convenient because the relevant
contracting variable will have a ￿xed support.
The cost of e⁄ort is g (e); a strictly convex function, that satis￿es ge(e) > 0 for e > 0; gee(e) > 0
for all e; ge(0) = 0; and lime!e ge(e) = 1; where e is an upper bound on e that can be taken as
in￿nite most of the time, except for some speci￿c examples.
The game has the following time structure:
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
Po⁄ers
amenu of
contracts
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Aexerts
e⁄ort e
s is realized
and observed
by A
￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
A accepts
a contract
or refuses
to participate
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
A produces
and delivers
and learns the
true costs ￿
only when producing
10This approach to model dependence among random variables is closely related to the notion of a copula, de￿ned
as the distribution function C (P (￿);K (￿);￿) on [0;1]2 : The marginal distributions of P and K are uniform on
[0;1], regardless of the functions P (￿) and K (￿) themselves. The function C (￿) embodies the correlation structure
between the random variables. In the present context, it is more convenient to specify the joint distribution over ￿
and K (￿): Otherwise the structure is the same.
10First, the principal o⁄ers a menu of contracts. Then the agent chooses an e⁄ort level, e; that
determines the informativeness of the experiment. The experiment is realized and observed by
the agent. Given this information he decides whether or not to participate, and, contingent on
participating, also which contract to accept. If the agent refuses to participate the game ends. If
the agent agreed to participate, production and transfers take place according to the contract the
agent has chosen. Notice that the agent learns the true cost only at the time when he produces, not
before. In particular, he does not know the true cost when he selects any of the o⁄ered contracts
or his outside option. I assume that the agent￿ s choice of e⁄ort is not observable to the principal
and that the value of the signal is the agent￿ s private knowledge.
3 Justifying a First Order Approach
As is customary, I will characterize optimal solutions to the contracting problem taking as given
that the principal whishes to implement a given level of e⁄ort, and will say very little about the
optimal choice of e⁄ort to implement11.
I think of contracting in terms of mechanism design. A mechanism is a tuple fq(￿);t(￿)g which
speci￿es quantities of production and transfers to the agent as a function of a (vector valued)
message m; the agent sends to the principal. Invoking the Revelation Principle I can restrict
attention to direct, incentive compatible mechanisms, fq(￿);t(￿)g that depend only on a reported
tuple of signal realization and value of e⁄ort (^ s; ^ e): Hence, one can write the principal￿ s problem
as follows:
max
q(￿;￿);t(￿;￿)
Z s
s
(V (q (s;e)) ￿ t(s;e))ds (3)
s.t.
8s;e :
Z ￿
￿
(t(s;e) ￿ ￿q (s;e))dH (￿ js;e) ￿
Z ￿
￿
(t(^ s; ^ e) ￿ ￿q (^ s; ^ e))dH (￿ js;e) 8^ s; ^ e (4)
Z ￿
￿
(t(s;e) ￿ ￿q (s;e))dH (￿ js;e) ￿ 08s;e (5)
e 2 argmax
e
(Z s
s
 Z ￿
￿
(t(s;e) ￿ ￿q (s;e))dH (￿ js;e)
!
ds ￿ g (e)
)
(6)
(4) requires that the agent ￿nds it optimal to report the true signal value and the true signal
informativeness. (5) ensures that the agent ￿nds it optimal to participate for all possible realizations
11As is well known from the problem of pure moral hazard, the problem of determining the optimal choice of
e⁄ort has almost no regularity structure.
11of signal and informativeness. (6) imposes that the agent￿ s choice of how much e⁄ort to acquire is
optimal given the contract the principal o⁄ers. Observe that the agent￿ s ex ante expected utility
net of costs of information acquisition is always nonnegative. Notice that I impose (5) for all values
of s and e; not only the equilibrium choice of e⁄ort. This involves no loss of generality under the
non-moving support assumption. Extensions to the case of moving supports will be studied below.
The screening problem is multi-dimensional, and therefore potentially extremely complicated.
However, due to the fact that the agent￿ s utility is linear in ￿; and linearity is preserved under expec-
tations, the agent￿ s utility depends e⁄ectively only on the one-dimensional statistic
R ￿
￿ ￿dH (￿ js;e)
(and the agent￿ s reported type). For this reason, similar to Biais et al. (2000) in a di⁄erent context,
we can observe that non-stochastic mechanisms can only make use of this one dimensional statistic
of the type instead of the two-dimensional type itself.12 Since the agent￿ s conditional expectation
is the relevant contracting variable it is important to understand the properties of this variable.
Denote the function
￿ (s;e) =
Z ￿
￿
￿dH (￿ js;e)
Suppose that ￿ (s;e) = ￿ for some real number ￿: Given that ￿ (s;e) is increasing in s; the function
is invertible and the signal that generated a value of the conditional expectation equal to ￿ satis￿es
s = ￿￿1 (￿;e): Ex ante, i.e., before s is realized, the value of the conditional expectation is a
random variable itself, ￿ say. Using the fact that the distribution of s is uniform, the cdf of ￿ for
given e is
F (￿;e) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 for￿ < ￿ (s;e)
￿￿1 (￿;e) for￿ (s;e) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (s;e)
1 ￿ > ￿ (s;e)
(7)
Due to condition (2), the support of ￿ is the interval
￿
￿;￿
￿
; independent of e⁄ort. Formally, I have
￿ = ￿ (s;e) for all e and ￿ = ￿ (s;e) for all e: Together with the law of iterated expectations, the
non-moving support property places some restrictions on the in￿ uence of e on F (￿;e): De￿ne EX
as the expectation operator when the expectation is taken with respect to X. The law of iterated
expectations requires that ES [E￿ [￿js;e]] = E￿ [￿]: Changing variables and integrating by parts,
I can write
Es [E￿ [￿js;e]] = ￿ ￿
Z ￿
￿
F (￿;e)d￿
12Bergemann and V￿lim￿ki (2002) have noted that this is also the relevant contracting variable in ex post e¢ cient
mechanisms in the linear environment, since e¢ cient mechanisms are non-stochastic.
12This property must hold for any e: Since E￿ [￿] is independent of e; it follows that
Z ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿ = 0 (8)
(8) is a condition that any model with ￿xed supports must ful￿l. If (8) fails to hold, then an increase
in e⁄ort changes the ex ante mean of the distribution, which implies that e⁄ort is not purely a
measure of informativeness but also of something else. It is obvious that the same conditions imply
also that
Z ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e)d￿ = 0 (9)
I now use this change of variables to state (3) s.t. (4); (5) and (6); equivalently as a message game
with messages ^ ￿ 2
￿
￿;￿
￿
about ￿perceived costs￿ . In this formulation, the principal￿ s problem is
max
q(￿);t(￿)
Z ￿ ￿
￿
￿
(V (q (￿)) ￿ t(￿))dF (￿;e)
s:t:
t(￿) ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ t
￿
^ ￿
￿
￿ ￿q
￿
^ ￿
￿
8￿;^ ￿
t(￿) ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ 08￿
e 2 argmax
e
8
<
:
Z ￿ ￿
￿
￿
(t(￿) ￿ ￿q (￿))dF (￿;e) ￿ g (e)
9
=
;
In order to solve this problem I need to be able to replace the ￿nal constraint by a ￿rst-order
condition.
Proposition 1 The principal￿ s problem (3) s.t. (4); (5) and (6) is equivalent to the following
problem
max
q(￿)
Z ￿ ￿
￿
￿
V (q (￿)) ￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
q (￿)
￿
f (￿;e)d￿ (10)
+￿
 Z ￿ ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)q (￿)d￿ ￿ ge (e)
!
s:t:q￿ (￿) ￿ 0
for some Lagrange multiplier ￿ if and only if
Z y
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿ ￿ 08y (11)
and (8); and
Z y
￿
Fee (￿;e)d￿ ￿ 08y (12)
13and (9): That is, if and only if an increase in e induces a mean preserving spread in the sense of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), at a decreasing rate.
It is well known13 that the set of implementable contracts satis￿es t(￿) = ￿q(￿)+
R ￿
￿ q(￿)d￿ and
q￿ (￿) ￿ 0: Substituting out transfers and integrating by parts one obtains the principal￿ s objective
function: the principal maximizes expected surplus net of the agent￿ s virtual surplus (Myerson
(1981)). Proceeding likewise for the agent￿ s expected utility one obtains the expression in the
constraint to problem (10): After an integration by parts the agent￿ s ￿rst-order condition can then
be expressed as
￿
Z ￿ ￿
￿
Z ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿q￿ (￿)d￿ ￿ ge (e) = 0 (13)
From (13) it is obvious that (11) renders the agent￿ s expected gross utility (gross of costs of
information acquisition) non-decreasing in e for any non-increasing quantity schedule; (12) renders
the agent￿ s expected gross utility concave in e. The agent is in fact a quasi-risk lover because
his indirect utility under any implementable contract is a convex function of ￿ (Rochet (1985)).
Therefore he likes increases in risk in the distribution of types in the sense of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970)14. Moreover, since the ￿rst-order condition must be a valid description for any
non-increasing quantity schedule, conditions (11) and (12) are also necessary. The complete proof
is in the appendix.
The upshot of proposition 1 is that one can complement the Mirrlees approach to reporting
by a ￿rst-order approach to information acquisition, which yields a fairly easily tractable problem.
Before I proceed to apply the approach to the speci￿c context of procurement, I characterize su¢ -
cient conditions on the Bayesian updating process that induce second order stochastic dominance
shifts in the distribution of ￿:
4 On the Informativeness of Experiments
In this section I study the properties of the distribution of the conditional expectation. I obtain
su¢ cient conditions on the conditional distribution of ￿ given s and e such that the distributions
of the conditional expectation for di⁄erent levels of e can be ordered by Second Order Stochastic
Dominance.
13For convenience of the reader the derivation is reproduced in the appendix. A more detailed treatment is found
in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chap 7.
14See also Dai and Lewis (2005), who have observed this independently in a two experiment model.
14Recall that a high signal indicates a high ￿ in the sense of (1): This sort of dependence arises
naturally if, e.g., ￿ and s are a¢ liated. Consider now the dependence on e: Let ~ s ￿ ESS denote
the expected value of the signal s: I impose the following two conditions. First, a local FOSD
condition, that I shall denote LFOSD henceforth:
He (￿ js;e) > 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) and He (￿ js;e) < 0 for s 2 (~ s;s) (14)
Second, a local concavity/convexity condition of the distribution function, that I shall denote
LCDFC henceforth
Hee (￿ js;e) ￿ 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) and Hee (￿ js;e) ￿ 0 for s 2 (~ s;s) (15)
The reason I impose these conditions in a local rather than the usual global sense is because a
global version of (14) would imply that for each s an increase in e increases the posterior. But
since the distribution of the signal is ￿xed, this would imply an increase in the ex ante mean,
which is inconsistent with the law of iterated expectations. Similarly, note that the assumption
that supports are non-moving, (2), directly implies that Hee (￿js;e) = Hee (￿js;e) = 0: Therefore,
I have to impose local restrictions on the concavity/convexity of the distribution function, again
because the usual global version would be inconsistent with the law of iterated expectations.
Let ~ ￿ ￿ E￿￿: Experiments that satisfy these conditions have the desired properties:
Proposition 2 Assume that experiments satisfy (1); (2); (14); and (15): Then,
i) F (￿;e) has a non-moving support; for all e F (￿;e) = 0 and F
￿
￿;e
￿
= 1;
ii) F (￿;e) satis￿es
Fe (￿;e) = Fe
￿
~ ￿;e
￿
= Fe
￿
￿;e
￿
= 0
Fe (￿;e) > 0for￿ 2
￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e) < 0for￿ 2
￿
~ ￿;￿
￿
and thus condition (11); and
iii) F (￿;e) satis￿es
Fee (￿;e) = Fee
￿
~ ￿;e
￿
= Fee
￿
￿;e
￿
= 0
Fee (￿;e) ￿ 0for￿ 2
￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e) ￿ 0for￿ 2
￿
~ ￿;￿
￿
and thus condition (12):
15We know from (7) that the properties of the distribution function F (￿;e) simply correspond to
the properties of the inverse of the conditional expectation function. Relative to the prior mean the
agent revises his posterior expectation upwards if he receives a signal higher than ex ante expected,
and downwards if he receives a downward surprise. If he receives the expected signal, s = ~ s; no
revision takes place. The upward (downward) revision for surprisingly high (low) signals is the
larger the higher is e: As a consequence the conditional expectation functions for di⁄erent e all
cross at ￿ = ￿ (s;e); at ￿ = ￿ (s;e); and at the prior mean ~ ￿: Hence, all distributions of F (￿;e) for
di⁄erent levels of e⁄ort satisfy a triple crossing property, and cross at the bounds of the support
and at the prior mean ~ ￿: The distribution of ￿ inherits the concavity/convexity properties of the
conditional distribution of ￿ given s and e:
Before I illustrate these results with an example, I give alternative su¢ cient conditions on the
posteriors that justify conditions (11) and (12) in proposition 1. Although these conditions are
more restrictive, they may prove useful in other applications, because they imply more structure.
In particular, one may impose a local version of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property:
@
@￿
￿
he (￿ js;e)
h(￿ js;e)
￿
< 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) and
@
@￿
￿
he (￿ js;e)
h(￿ js;e)
￿
> 0 for s 2 (~ s;s)
If the conditional distribution satis￿es this condition and the agent receives a signal which is
higher (lower) than ex ante expected, then it is relatively more likely that indeed the state is
high (low) for a higher level of e: In this sense the signal is more informative when e⁄ort is
higher. Non-moving supports and di⁄erentiability in s then require then that @
@￿
￿
he(￿js;e)
h(￿js;e)
￿
= 0
for s 2 fs; ~ s;sg: Building on the proofs of Milgrom (1981) it is straightforward to show that these
local version of the MLRP condition imply (14): Moreover, one can also show that under these
assumptions the distribution of ￿ inherits the Local Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, i.e., one
has @
@￿
￿
fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
T 0 for ￿ T ~ ￿:15 However, as is well known (Jewitt (1988)), joint conditions on
the likelihood ratios and the convexity properties of the distribution function are rather restrictive.
Therefore, I use the weaker condition (14):
The following simple example illustrates the properties. With a slight departure of our no-
tation let the marginal cost be ￿ = B + ￿￿ for some B > 1 and suppose the marginal of
￿￿ is uniform on [￿1;1]: The marginal of s is uniform on [0;1] and the posterior density is
h(￿￿js;e) =
1+￿￿(a+bx(s)+ey(s))
2 ; where x(s) is an increasing function satisfying x(0) = 0 and
x(1) = 1 and y (s) = s
￿
s ￿ 1
2
￿
(1 ￿ s): h(￿￿js;e) satis￿es conditions (14) and (15): In fact it
also satis￿es the local monotone likelihood ratio property: Computing the posterior expectation, I
15This last statement follows directly from Milgrom￿ s (1981) proposition 3.
16obtain ￿ (s;e) = B + 1
3 (a + bx(s) + ey (s)): Sensible parameter restrictions are a = ￿3 and b = 6;
in which case the support of ￿ (s;e) coincides with the support of ￿: For various reasons e; the
upper bound on e; must not be too large. Provided this is the case, h(￿￿js;e) is strictly positive
everywhere and ￿ (s;e) is strictly increasing in s:
The function y (s) embodies the important assumptions that I have made sofar. y (s) takes a
value of zero for s 2
￿
0; 1
2;1
￿
; it is negative for s 2
￿
0; 1
2
￿
and positive for s 2
￿1
2;1
￿
: Therefore,
an increase in e decreases the conditional expectation for low signal values and increases it for high
values. Since
1 Z
0
y (s)ds = 0, the law of iterated expectations is respected for all e:
In addition to these conditions that ensure the regularity properties of my problem with respect
to the agent￿ s choice of e⁄ort, it will also be convenient to have conditions that guarantee that the
monotonicity constraint in problem (10) is non binding at the optimum. Without such regularity
conditions, one may encounter problems of bunching that are well known and do not add much to
the present discussion.
Proposition 3 If H (￿ js;e) satis￿es condition (1); then the distribution of ￿ has full support and
no atoms for all e: The distribution of ￿ satis￿es in addition @
@￿
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) ￿ 0 if and only if
s￿ss (s;e)
￿s (s;e)
￿ ￿18s (16)
The distribution satis￿es @
2
@￿2
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) ￿ 0 (￿ 0) at ￿ if and only if @
@s
￿
s￿ss(s;e)
￿s(s;e)
￿
￿ 0 (￿ 0) at
s = ￿￿1 (￿;e):
In terms of the conditional distribution, condition (16) is equivalent to the condition
d
ds
2
6
4s
￿ Z
￿
Hs (￿ js;e)d￿
3
7
5 ￿ 0; but that is hardly more informative than condition (16); which says
that the distribution of ￿ has a non-decreasing inverse hazard rate if and only if the conditional
expectation function is not too concave in the sense of a standard curvature measure. I will
henceforth assume that the posterior expectation satis￿es (16) for all values of e; since this avoids
unnecessary technicalities. In the example given above the condition is satis￿ed for e not too large if
the function x satis￿es
sxss(s)
xs(s) > ￿1 for all s: For completeness I state also the convexity properties
of the inverse hazard rate at this point. This will prove useful for the analysis of contracts below. I
show in the appendix that for the speci￿c example where x(s) = 9
5 ￿ 1
5 (s ￿ 3)
2 and e is su¢ ciently
small; the distribution of ￿ has a concave inverse hazard rate; and for the speci￿c case where
x(s) = ￿81
19 + 1
19 (s + 9)
2 and e is su¢ ciently small, the inverse hazard rate is convex.
17In the remainder of this paper I apply the ￿rst-order approach to study the speci￿c problem of
procurement. The ￿rst step is to sign the multiplier ￿: The second is to characterize the structure
of optimal contracts.
5 The Value of Information
In this section I establish two results. First, I show that it is optimal to implement a strictly positive
amount of information acquisition, that is, that the optimal level of e⁄ort is strictly positive. I
conclude from this result that the value of information to the principal is positive. Second, I show
that the level of e⁄ort can be either too small or too large relative to the amount of e⁄ort that
maximizes the expected surplus. In particular I will show that whether there is too much or too
little information acquisition depends on the principal￿ s quasi-attitudes toward risk, that is, on the
shape of his indirect utility function.
Consider ￿rst the value of information to the principal, which I de￿ne as the di⁄erence in
expected utility when he implements a positive amount of e⁄ort and zero e⁄ort. Implementing
e = 0 requires that information has no value to the agent, neither for his decision what type to
report conditional on participating, nor on his decision whether or not to participate. This means
that production must be independent of the agent￿ s announced type and that the transfer is so
high that even type ￿ breaks even ex post. This is very expensive from the principal￿ s perspective.
To show this is suboptimal, I have to show that there exist contracts that give the principal a
higher utility. It is hard to show this directly, because the level of the principal￿ s utility depends
on the shadow cost of implementing e⁄ort at the optimal level of e⁄ort: Therefore I establish my
result in an indirect way, showing that there exist (possibly suboptimal) contracts that implement
a positive level of e⁄ort at a zero shadow cost and that give the principal a higher utility than any
contract that implements e = 0: Since the principal will be able to do even better if he is allowed
to implement any level of e⁄ort, this argument shows that implementing e = 0 can￿ t be optimal,
or in other words, that information has a strictly positive value to the principal.
To make this argument I denote q (￿;e) an optimal quantity schedule contingent on the e⁄ort
level e: Suppose the principal o⁄ers a contract that implements a level of e⁄ort e at zero shadow
cost; that is the value of the multiplier ￿; associated to the problem of implementing e⁄ort e is
zero. Then, we know from Baron and Myerson (1982) that the optimal quantity schedule satis￿es
18the condition
Vq
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
= ￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
(17)
To see this, maximize (10) point-wise with respect to q for ￿ = 0: Conversely consistency with
￿ = 0 requires that the agent be willing to choose the e⁄ort level e that the quantity schedule
qBM (￿;e) is conditioned on. Let ^ e denote the level of e⁄ort that the agent ￿nds optimal to exert
when he is o⁄ered a contract with associated quantity schedule qBM (￿;e): ^ e satis￿es the ￿rst-order
condition
Z ￿ ￿
￿
Fe (￿; ^ e)qBM (￿;e)d￿ ￿ ge (^ e) = 0 (18)
The solution of (18); when viewed as a function of e; de￿nes a best reply for the agent, ^ e =
r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
: Contract o⁄er and e⁄ort choice are in simultaneous equilibrium if
e = r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
(19)
Let e denote the (possibly empty) set of solutions to (19): If e is non-empty, then the principal
can implement any e⁄ort level in e by o⁄ering the associated Baron-Myerson quantity schedule
de￿ned by (17). O⁄ering such a contract, the principal extracts some rent, and therefore he does
better than under the contract where the agent is always paid as if he had costs equal to ￿.
Proposition 4 It is optimal to implement a positive level of e⁄ort. Formally, the set e; de￿ned
by (17); (18), and (19); is non-empty.
To ease notation again in what follows I will drop the dependence of the optimal quantity
schedule on e where this can be done without creating confusion. Consider a locally optimal choice
of e⁄ort to implement, and denote such a locally optimal value of e by e￿; and the associated
multiplier by ￿￿: Such a choice satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition
Z ￿ ￿
￿
((V (q (￿)) ￿ ￿q (￿)fe (￿;e￿)) ￿ Fe (￿;e￿)q (￿))d￿ + ￿￿
 Z ￿ ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e￿)q (￿)d￿ ￿ gee (e￿)
!
= 0
where I have used the envelope theorem to conclude that all indirect e⁄ects through e and ￿ on
q (￿;e) are zero around an optimum.16 Rearranging the ￿rst-order condition, and substituting from
the ￿rst-order condition with respect to the agent￿ s e⁄ort choice, I can write
￿￿ =
R ￿ ￿
￿ (V (q (￿)) ￿ ￿q (￿)fe (￿;e￿))d￿ ￿ ge (e￿)
￿
￿R ￿ ￿
￿ Fee (￿;e￿)q (￿)d￿ ￿ gee (e￿)
￿
16Notice also that the envelope theorem, and therefore the statement of the ￿rst-order condition, applies regardless
of whether or not the contract is strictly monotonic.
19The term inside the brackets of the denominator is the second-order condition of the agent￿ s e⁄ort
choice. Hence, the sign of ￿￿ is equal to the sign of the numerator. If the increase in the social
surplus due to an increase in e exceeds the marginal cost of acquiring information, then ￿￿ is
positive; if the two terms are just equal then ￿￿ is zero; otherwise the multiplier is negative at the
optimum. I will now argue that ￿￿ can be of either sign at a stationary point of the principal￿ s
problem, and will give su¢ cient conditions for each case to occur.
I use the following chain of reasoning. Let ~ e denote an element of e; de￿ned by (19); and
let ~ e denote the smallest element in e and let ~ e denote the largest element in e: By de￿nition
￿(~ e) = ￿
￿
~ e
￿
= 0: Since an increase in ￿ makes contracts more risky in the sense of a mean
preserving spread, and the agent is a quasi-risk lover - because incentive compatible indirect utility
pro￿les are convex - we must have ￿ < 0 for any e < ~ e and ￿ > 0 for any e > ~ e. To establish my
result, it su¢ ces to give su¢ cient conditions that render the principal￿ s utility i) locally decreasing
around e = ~ e and ii) locally increasing around e = ~ e: By implication the principal￿ s utility will be
locally decreasing around ~ e in the former case and will be locally increasing around ~ e in the latter
case, which implies the desired result.
An increase in the agent￿ s e⁄ort increases the likelihood of more extreme cost perceptions.
The principal bene￿ts ex post if the agent￿ s signal is better than expected but is harmed if the
agent perceives his cost as being higher. Whether the principal likes to consume such a lottery
depends on the shape of his indirect utility function. In turn the shape of the indirect utility
function depends on the curvature of the direct utility function and on properties of the family of
distributions fF (￿;e)ge￿0 : De￿ne
￿(q) =
￿V 00 (q)
V 0 (q)
￿(q) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion with respect to production shocks in the
function V (q):
Proposition 5 i) If ￿q (q) ￿ 0 and
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) is convex in ￿ for all e; then there exists a stationary
point to the principal￿ s problem of choosing e where ￿ < 0:
ii) Suppose that ￿q (q) ￿ 0 and
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) is concave in ￿ for all e: Then there exists z > 0 such that
￿ ￿ z implies that there exists a stationary point to the principal￿ s problem of choosing e where
￿ > 0:
The examples given after proposition 3 illustrate the conditions on the inverse hazard rates.
Non-decreasing absolute risk aversion in the direct utility function V (q) plus a convex inverse
20hazard rate are su¢ cient to render the principal￿ s indirect utility function concave everywhere.
Therefore he behaves as a quasi-risk averter and is harmed by a small increase in e⁄ort. However,
if V (q) has the more natural property of non-increasing absolute risk aversion and the inverse
hazard rate is concave then the opposite may happen. However, this case is somewhat more subtle
because it is impossible to render the principal￿ s indirect utility function convex everywhere. Note
that these arguments show the existence of local maximizers with the property that ￿ is positive
or negative, respectively; of course, the proposition does not say anything about the optimal level
of e⁄ort to implement. Since it is well known that the problem of choosing an optimal level of
e⁄ort to implement has almost no structure, I shall not dwell on this here. Instead I will proceed
to characterize optimal contracts for both constellations where the shadow cost of e⁄ort is positive
or negative.
6 The Structure of Contracts
Let fq￿ (￿);t￿ (￿)g8￿ denote a menu of contracts that optimally implements a given amount of
e⁄ort in a truth-telling equilibrium. I shall characterize such contracts, taking their existence
for granted.17 The main obstacle to this analysis is that value of the multiplier ￿ is unknown. A
global treatment necessitates the use of dynamic optimization and delivers little additional insights.
Therefore it is useful to characterize the solution for e⁄ort levels that are easy to implement in the
following sense. De￿ne the measures ￿ ￿
s
V ar(
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) )
V ar(￿+
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e))
and ￿ ￿
s
V ar(
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) j￿￿E￿)
V ar(￿+
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)j￿￿E￿)
: Heuris-
tically, the higher is ￿; the ￿easier￿is the inference about the unobserved e⁄ort from observing ￿
relative the variation of the agent￿ s virtual surplus. ￿ measures an analogous ratio when only a
subinterval of ￿ is considered.
Lemma 1 Suppose that @
@￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) ￿ 1
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ 0 for all ￿ and that @
@￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) + 1
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
0 for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿: Then, the multiplier satis￿es ￿ 1
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿:
j￿j measures the utility loss due to the need to give extra (less) incentives for information
gathering when marginal costs of information gathering, evaluated at a given e⁄ort level, increase
by a small amount. One way to place a bound on this loss is to ￿nd a simple contract that
continues to implement a given level of e⁄ort when marginal cost of e⁄ort increase (decrease) by a
small amount. One di¢ culty is again to avoid the need to invoke control theory to make this point.
17Conditions for existence of solutions for exogenous type distributions can be found in Guesnerie and La⁄ont
(1984). With a suitable adjustment for the endogeneity of information their results could be carried over.
21The monotonicity conditions in the statement of the lemma are imposed to this end. Then, starting
from a strictly monotonic contract, the principal can shock the amount of production by adding
"
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) to the original quantity schedule. Since
￿ Z
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿ = 0; this shock constitutes a
mean-preserving spread, which has two e⁄ects. On the one hand, it gives the agent an additional
incentive to acquire information. On the other hand it reduces the principal￿ s payo⁄by making his
consumption more risky and by increasing the expected payments to the agent by an amount that is
proportional to the covariance between the agent￿ s virtual surplus and the measure
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) : In turn,
the covariance of these two measures is bounded above by the product of their standard deviations.
Finally, ", the size of the shock needed to undo the increase in marginal costs, is computed from the
agent￿ s incentive constraint for the choice of e; " is inversely proportional to the variance of
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) :
Taken together, this reasoning shows that the incremental cost of implementing the original level
of e⁄ort with this contract is at most 1
￿: Similarly, when the marginal cost of e⁄ort at the current
level of e⁄ort decreases by a small amount, the principal can prevent the agent from increasing
his choice of e⁄ort by raising production by ￿"
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿: Since an increase in the agent￿ s
e⁄ort would make extreme cost perceptions more likely, Fe (￿;e) is non-positive for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿; so that
the agent has less of an incentive to acquire information. Using the same reasoning as for the case
where the marginal cost increases, I show that the utility loss to the principal resulting from this
change of contracts is at most 1
￿:
In terms of the example given above, these conditions are satis￿ed, e.g., if the posterior density
takes the form h(￿￿js;e) =
1+￿￿(a+bx(s)+e￿y(s))
2 when ￿ is su¢ ciently small. The reason is
that the variation in ￿ is then largely exogenous and depends on the function x(s); whereas the
variation in
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) = ￿￿1
e (￿;e)￿s (￿e (￿;e);e) depends on the level of ￿. If ￿ is small, then the
e⁄ect of an increase in e on the conditional expectation is small for all signals that the agent
may receive. Therefore the variance of this measure is small as well. Thus, if the agent receives
information that does have a large impact on his information in costs, but the informative content
of this information is largely independent of the agent￿ s e⁄ort, then the value of the multiplier is
bounded. Conversely, the value of the multiplier may become large, when an increase in the agent￿ s
e⁄ort changes the informative content of the signal dramatically. I abstain from a discussion of
the latter case, because the advantage of bounding the absolute value of the multiplier is that one
can characterize the solution to the contracting problem without recourse to control techniques:
Proposition 6 Suppose that @
@￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) ￿ 1
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ 0 for all ￿ and that @
@￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) + 1
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
220 for all ￿: Then the optimal quantity schedule is characterized by
Vq (q￿ (￿)) = ￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
(20)
The formal proof of this proposition is omitted, since it follows straightforwardly from the
previous results. The production schedule coincides with the Baron Myerson schedule at the top,
at the prior mean, and at the bottom. Otherwise, there is an additional distortion. The direction
of the extra distortion depends on whether the principal wants to give the agent more or less of
an incentive to acquire information relative to the Baron Myerson contract. In the former case
production is increased for surprisingly low cost perceptions and decreased for surprisingly bad
cost assessments. The sensitivity of the production scheme with respect to the agent￿ s information
is increased to provide extra incentives for information acquisition. In the latter case, the reverse
happens and production is more equalized in order to dampen the agent￿ s interest in additional
information. The size of the additional distortion depends on how informative a given message is
about the agent￿ s unobserved e⁄ort choice.18
In the remainder of this article I study how these results are a⁄ected by changes in the under-
lying structure of experiments.
7 Alternative Experiment Structures
7.1 Moving Supports and Distortions at the top
Sofar, I have characterized solutions to the contracting problem when the support of the agent￿ s
conditional expectation is ￿xed. This is analytically very convenient, but moving supports may
easily arise. To see this, modify the example19 to the case where a = b = 0 and y (s) =
￿
s ￿ 1
2
￿
; so
that the posterior density becomes h(￿￿js;e) =
1+e(s￿ 1
2)￿￿
2 : Again this posterior satis￿es (14)
(in fact, also the local monotone likelihood ratio property) and (15): One veri￿es that ￿ (s;e) =
B +
e(s￿ 1
2)
3 : The bounds of the support are ￿ (s;e) = B ￿ e
6 and ￿ (s;e) = B + e
6: A sensible upper
bound on e is e = 6; in which case the support of ￿ for e = e coincides with the support of ￿;
otherwise, the support of ￿ is a subset of the support of ￿ and the upper bound is increasing in e
18The term
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) has an interpretation in terms of hypothesis testing. Write
Fe(￿;e)
F(￿;e) =
f(￿;e)
F(￿;e):
Fe(￿;e)
F(￿;e) is the
derivative of the log-likelihood if the statistician observes only if the values in a sample are smaller than ￿ and wants
to compute the optimal value of e: This measure is important in the contract because the production at ￿ changes
the rent of all types who are at least as e¢ cient as ￿: Division by
f(￿;e)
F(￿;e) normalizes by the conditional density.
19This speci￿cation of the example is adapted from Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001).
23and the lower bound is decreasing in e: For all values of e; the distribution of ￿ is uniform. Thus
it is natural to wonder how the analysis is a⁄ected by the possibility of moving supports.
I will show in this section that there are some problems with the ￿rst-order approach; it is not
possible to justify such an approach in general. However, whenever such an approach is valid, then
the main qualitative features of contracts remain unchanged. However, one notable exception is
that there is now a distortion at the top.
There are some essential di⁄erences in the agent￿ s problem. I will stick to the following notation
in this section. I let ￿(e) and ￿(e) denote the upper and the lower bound of the support of the
conditional mean, respectively. I assume that the upper bound is increasing in e and that the lower
bound is decreasing in e: In addition, I let ￿ and ￿ denote the bounds of the support associated to
the e⁄ort level that the principal wishes to implement. Notice that these are independent of the
agent￿ s actual actions. Obviously the principal￿ s contract o⁄er satis￿es the participation constraint
of type ￿ with equality. Suppose the agent chooses an e⁄ort level that is higher than the one the
principal wishes to implement. If the agent receives a high signal, then his participation constraint
is violated for all ￿ 2
￿
￿;￿(e)
￿
: So, the agent refuses to participate and obtains zero rent in this
case. Suppose after choosing an e⁄ort level that is too high, the agent receives a very low signal.
In that case, for ￿ 2 [￿(e);￿] the agent will announce to have costs equal to ￿: Suppose on the
other hand, that the agent chooses an e⁄ort level which is too low. In that case we have ￿(e) < ￿;
which implies that type ￿(e) receives a strictly positive rent equal to
￿ Z
￿(e)
q (￿)d￿: It follows from
these considerations that I can always write the agent￿ s indirect utility, u(￿); for any given e⁄ort
choice and any e⁄ort (and support) that the principal wishes to implement as
u(￿) = max
8
> <
> :
0;
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
9
> =
> ;
(21)
Finally, consider the probability distribution. It has the properties that F (￿(e);e) = 0 and
F
￿
￿(e);e
￿
= 1. Moreover, it satis￿es
dF (￿;e)
d￿
=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 for ￿ < ￿(e)
f (￿;e) > 0 for ￿ 2
￿
￿(e);￿(e)
￿
0 ￿ > ￿(e)
(22)
I can now derive the agent￿ s ex ante expected utility from (21) and (22): This is somewhat tedious
but straightforward, so I relegate the derivation of the following result to the appendix.
24Result 1 With moving supports the agent￿ s ex ante expected indirect utility satis￿es
E￿ [u(￿)] =
Z ￿ ￿
￿
F (￿;e)q (￿;e)d￿
At ￿rst sight it is puzzling that there seems to be no di⁄erence to the case of non-moving supports.
There are di⁄erences, but the fact is that (21) and (22) go together so nicely that the di⁄erences
add up to zero. However, there is a crucial di⁄erence at the ex ante stage when the agent chooses
the level of e⁄ort. An incentive compatible choice of e⁄ort must satisfy the condition
e = argmax
^ e
8
> <
> :
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)F (￿; ^ e)d￿ ￿ g (^ e)
9
> =
> ;
(23)
Unfortunately, (23) cannot simply be replaced by the ￿rst-order condition
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)Fe (￿;e)d￿ ￿ ge (e) = 0
for any arbitrary, incentive compatible quantity schedule q (￿): Even if I impose the same condi-
tions as before, namely that the law of iterated expectations holds, and that an increase in e⁄ort
induces a local ￿rst order stochastic dominance shift, and that the distribution satis￿es the local
concavity/convexity conditions, it is no longer true that the agent prefers to have more information
(at the same cost). To see this, integrate by parts to obtain
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)Fe (￿;e)d￿ = q
￿
￿
￿
Fe
￿
￿;e
￿
￿ q (￿)Fe (￿;e) ￿
￿ Z
￿
q￿ (￿)
￿ Z
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿d￿
Under my assumptions q
￿
￿
￿
Fe
￿
￿;e
￿
￿ q (￿)Fe (￿;e) ￿ 0; and this inequality is strict for the case
where ￿ < ￿(e) and ￿ > ￿(e): Hence, one can ￿nd monotonic quantity schedules where the agent
does not value additional information. It is also no longer true that the agent￿ s expected indirect
utility (gross of e⁄ort costs) is concave in e⁄ort, since
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)Fee (￿;e)d￿ = q
￿
￿
￿
Fee
￿
￿;e
￿
￿ q (￿)Fee (￿;e) ￿
￿ Z
￿
q￿ (￿)
￿ Z
￿
Fee (￿;e)d￿d￿
and q
￿
￿
￿
Fee
￿
￿;e
￿
￿q (￿)Fee (￿;e) ￿ 0 with a strict inequality when ￿ < ￿(e) and ￿ > ￿(e): Hence,
the same caveat applies here. However, whenever the ￿rst-order condition adequately describes
the solution to the agent￿ s problem, I have the following result.
Proposition 7 If the ￿rst-order approach is valid, and the conditions in lemma 1 and proposition
6 hold, then an optimal quantity schedule satis￿es the condition
Vq (q￿ (￿)) = ￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
25For the case where ￿ > 0 (￿ < 0) the level of production at the top is higher (smaller) than the
Baron Myerson quantity at ￿ = ￿; the level of production at ￿ = ￿ is lower (higher) than the Baron
Myerson quantity.
The rationale for this result is simple. With moving supports, an increase of the agent￿ s
e⁄ort does have an impact on the mass at the bounds of the support that the principal wishes to
implement; at the lower bound the agent￿ s e⁄ort increases the value of the distribution function at
the margin, at the upper bound of the support his e⁄ort decreases the mass at the margin. Hence,
there are additional distortions to consider relative to the case with a ￿xed distribution of types.
7.2 Stochastic Experiments
I end this article with a discussion of a class of updating processes that gives rise to a particularly
tractable model. Suppose e⁄ort does not in￿ uence the posterior distribution directly, but rather
in￿ uences only the likelihood of obtaining di⁄erent posteriors that are independent of e⁄ort. I
show in this section that the ￿rst-order approach is rather easy to justify in that case. In addition,
all the qualitative insights developed for the more general model are still valid.
Suppose an experiment is the realization of two random variables, S and I; and a resulting
posterior with cdf H (￿js;i): The variable S is still the signal, I is an informativeness parameter.
Typical realizations of these variables are s 2 [s;s] = [0;1] and i 2 [0;1]; respectively. The
marginal distributions of s and i are independent of each other and fully supported with densities
k(s) = 1 for s 2 [0;1] (and zero otherwise) and l(i;e); respectively. Let L(i;e) denote the cdf
of the random variable i20. Assume that l(i;e) > 0 for all i and all e: Denote the conditional
expectation function as ￿ (s;i) =
R ￿
￿ ￿dH (￿ js;i). The interpretation of the random variable ￿ is
unchanged. Provided that ￿ (s;i) is strictly increasing in s for all i, the function is invertible and
we can write s = ￿￿1 (￿;i) for the value of s that generates the conditional expected value ￿: The
20An intuitive example of this experiment structure -although discrete instead of continuous- would take the signal
s as a red light on a junction, with signal realizations fred, orange, greeng and the informativeness of the signal as
fgood,badg: The informativeness refers to whether I expect to have priority if I receive a green realization. Assume
that informativeness depends only on whether the junction is in Napels or in Z￿rich, say. From observing the colour
of the signal I cannot infer whether I am in Napels or in Z￿rich. Knowing that I am in Z￿rich does not help me
to infer whether the signal should be red or green. Hence s and i are independent. Moreover, the frequency with
which the signal changes coulours is (probably) the same at junctions in Napels and Z￿rich. However, if I do know
that I am in Z￿rich this changes my posterior belief relative to the one I would have in Napels whether I will receive
priority on the junction when the signal is green.
26cdf of ￿ conditional on i is
Fi (￿;i) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 for￿ < ￿ (s;i)
￿￿1 (￿;i) for￿ (s;i) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (s;i)
1 ￿ > ￿ (s;i)
Let F (￿;e) denote the unconditional cdf of ￿: I have
F (￿;e) =
Z 1
0
Fi (￿;i)dL(i;e) (24)
By construction, ￿ is independent of e⁄ort and its distribution is fully supported on an interval
￿
￿;￿
￿
; independent of e⁄ort where ￿ = mini ￿ (s;i) and ￿ = maxi ￿ (s;i):
To order experiments, I assume that the posterior density satis￿es the local monotone likelihood
ratio property, formally, I assume that
@
@￿
￿
hi (￿ js;i)
h(￿ js;i)
￿
< 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) and
@
@￿
￿
hi (￿ js;i)
h(￿ js;i)
￿
> 0 for s 2 (~ s;s) (25)
and
@
@￿
￿
hi (￿ js;i)
h(￿ js;i)
￿
= 0 for s 2 fs; ~ s;sg (26)
As I have explained in section 3, (25) implies that higher values of i correspond to more informative
experiments. In particular, this implies again that conditional on a signal above (below) the mean,
the posterior distribution conditional on a given informativeness i is the higher (lower) in the sense
of FOSD the higher is i: In addition let
Le (i;e) ￿ 0 and Lee (i;e) ￿ 0 (27)
Then, an increase in e⁄ort makes it more likely to perform a more informative experiment; and
the marginal impact of e⁄ort on the distribution of experiments is decreasing in e: Within this
structure, I have the following result:
Proposition 8 Given conditions (25); (26); and (27); the distribution F (￿;e) satis￿es conditions
(11); (8); (12); and (9); and hence the ￿rst-order approach is valid. Under the monotonicity
conditions in proposition 6, the optimal quantity schedule satis￿es the condition
Vq (q￿ (￿)) = ￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
Thus, it is easy to justify a ￿rst-order approach if we think of the agent￿ s e⁄ort as of ￿span-
ning￿the possible posteriors. Moreover, this model is appealing because it comprises much of the
27existing literature and therefore generalizes the ￿ndings of this literature. All-or-nothing informa-
tion acquisition corresponds to the case where there are just two distributions of the conditional
expectation conditional on i, F0 (￿;0) and F1 (￿;1); the distribution F0 (￿;0) has mass one at
E￿￿ = E￿￿ and the distribution F1 (￿;1) corresponds to the distribution P (￿): In the current
setup I assume that the distribution F0 (￿;0) has no atoms, but of course it can be close to a
mass-point at E￿￿: This assumption eliminates the discontinuities found in the earlier literature.
Moreover, I allow for a continuum of levels of informativeness, i; that are (heuristically) ordered
the way that the distributions Fi (￿;i) are the closer to P (￿) the higher is i21: Since this model is
particularly easy to handle it should prove useful in further applications.
8 Conclusion
The main result of the paper is information and risk are equivalent in a wide class of reporting games
with endogenous information. It is justi￿ed to describe the amount of information acquisition by
the solution of a ￿rst-order condition for any incentive compatible contract, if and only if the agent￿ s
information gathering increases risk in the ex ante distribution of the conditional expectation in
the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Su¢ cient conditions on experiment structures are
provided that generate such an ordering. The robust results that follow from the approach are
that contracts that provide the agent with extra incentives for information acquisition are more
sensitive to the agent￿ s information relative to their ￿xed information counterparts. The reverse is
true when incentives for information acquisition are reduced. Results beyond these depend on the
speci￿c information structure and are therefore not robust.
The paper has derived a tractable modeling of information acquisition and a reduced form
which is relatively easy to handle. It can be used to address any problem of mechanism design in
the single agent case and extends easily to multi-agent mechanism design problems in the linear,
private values environment.
21I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
289 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1, preliminaries. Truth-telling: For convenience I summarize the
known features of the contract. For a more extensive treatment, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
Let u
￿
￿;^ ￿
￿
= t
￿
^ ￿
￿
￿ ￿q
￿
^ ￿
￿
and u(￿) = max^ ￿ t
￿
^ ￿
￿
￿ ￿q
￿
^ ￿
￿
: In a truth-telling equilibrium
^ ￿ = ￿: By the envelope theorem, u￿ (￿) = ￿q (￿): Moreover, the least e¢ cient type ￿; is indi⁄erent
between participating and not, u
￿
￿
￿
= 0: Hence u(￿) = ￿
R ￿
￿ u￿ (￿)d￿ =
R ￿
￿ q(￿)d￿: The ￿rst order
condition t^ ￿
￿
^ ￿
￿
￿ ￿q^ ￿
￿
^ ￿
￿￿ ￿
￿
^ ￿=￿
= 0 holds almost everywhere. Hence
￿
t^ ￿^ ￿
￿
^ ￿
￿
￿ ￿q^ ￿^ ￿
￿
^ ￿
￿￿
d^ ￿ ￿
q^ ￿
￿
^ ￿
￿
d￿ = 0; a.e., so that q^ ￿
￿
^ ￿
￿
￿ 0 is necessary for truth-telling to be locally optimal. Finally,
monotonicity makes the local ￿rst order condition su¢ cient for a global optimum in truth-telling.
Substituting t(￿) = ￿q(￿) +
R ￿
￿ q(￿)d￿ into the objective one has
Z ￿ ￿
￿
 
V (q (￿)) ￿
 
￿q (￿) +
Z ￿
￿
q(￿)d￿
!!
f (￿;e)d￿ (28)
Integration by parts delivers the representation in terms of expected surplus net of the agent￿ s
expected virtual surplus (Myerson (1981)),
R ￿ ￿
￿
￿
V (q (￿)) ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
q (￿)
￿
f (￿;e)d￿:
Consider now the e⁄ort constraint. After substitution of t(￿) = ￿q(￿) +
R ￿
￿ q(￿)d￿ one has
Z ￿ ￿
￿
(t(￿) ￿ ￿q (￿))dF (￿;e) =
Z ￿ ￿
￿
Z ￿
￿
q(￿)d￿dF (￿;e)
=
Z ￿ ￿
￿
F (￿;e)q (￿)d￿
Di⁄erentiating, and integrating by parts, using the property of nonmoving supports, one has
Z ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)q (￿)d￿ = ￿
Z ￿
￿
Z ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿q￿ (￿)d￿ ￿ 0
where the inequality follows from the implementability condition q￿ (￿) ￿ 0: Di⁄erentiating once
more
Z ￿ ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e)q (￿)d￿ = ￿
Z ￿ ￿
￿
Z ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e)d￿q￿ (￿)d￿ ￿ 0
since
R ￿ ￿
￿ Fee (￿;e)d￿ = 0 and
R ￿
￿ Fee (￿;e)d￿ ￿ 08￿ and q￿ (￿) ￿ 08￿: Hence, if (11) and (12) hold,
then the agent faces a strictly concave problem in e⁄ort and the ￿rst order condition in conjunction
with the implementability conditions t(￿) = ￿q(￿) +
R ￿
￿ q(￿)d￿ and q￿ (￿) ￿ 08￿ is necessary and
su¢ cient for
e 2 argmax
e
8
<
:
Z ￿ ￿
￿
￿
(t(￿) ￿ ￿q (￿))dF (￿;e) ￿ g (e)
9
=
;
To see the necessity part, suppose that (11) does not hold. For concreteness, suppose that
Fe (￿;e) < 0 on (￿;￿1) and Fe (￿;e) ￿ 0 else such that
R ￿ ￿
￿ Fe (￿;e)d￿ = 0: A contract that satis￿es
29the implementability condition is ~ q (￿) = ~ q > 0 for ￿ 2 [￿;￿1) and ~ q (￿) = 0 else. But then
Z ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e) ~ q (￿)d￿ < 08e
and the ￿rst order condition is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for the optimal choice of e: Likewise
suppose that (11) does hold but that (12) does not hold and suppose that Fee (￿;e) > 0 on (￿;￿1)
and Fee (￿;e) ￿ 0 else such that
R ￿ ￿
￿ Fee (￿;e)d￿ = 0: In this case under the implementable contract
~ q (￿);
R ￿
￿ Fe (￿;e) ~ q (￿)d￿ > 08e but
Z ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e) ~ q (￿)d￿ > 08e
Consequently, the ￿rst order condition is neither necessary (the optimal choice may be e = 0) nor
su¢ cient (the value of e that solves the ￿rst order condition may correspond to a minimum.)
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is given in two parts. In the ￿rst part I establish the
properties of the conditional expectation function that follow from the assumptions; in the second
part I use these characteristics to establish the properties of the distribution of the conditional
expectation.
Part I: The conditional expectation is given by
￿ Z
￿
￿h(￿js;e)d￿ = ￿ ￿
￿ Z
￿
H (￿js;e)d￿
Di⁄erentiating with respect to e I have
￿e (s;e) = ￿
￿ Z
￿
He (￿js;e)d￿
and
￿ee (s;e) = ￿
￿ Z
￿
Hee (￿js;e)d￿
It follows immediately that ￿e (s;e) = 0 and ￿ee (s;e) = 0 for s 2 fs; ~ s;sg: Moreover, if He (￿js;e) >
0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) then ￿e (s;e) < 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s); likewise, if Hee (￿js;e) ￿ 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) then
￿ee (s;e) ￿ 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s): Similarly, He (￿js;e) < 0 and Hee (￿js;e) ￿ 0 for s 2 (~ s;s) implies
that ￿e (s;e) > 0 and ￿ee (s;e) ￿ 0 for s 2 (~ s;s):
Part II: The cdf of ￿ is given by F (￿;e) = ￿￿1 (￿;e) for ￿ 2
￿
￿;￿
￿
: Moreover, if a function is
increasing (decreasing) and concave (convex), then its inverse is decreasing (increasing) and convex
(concave). Therefore, I have Fe (￿;e) > 0 and Fee (￿;e) ￿ 0 for ￿ 2
￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
; and Fe (￿;e) < 0 and
30Fee (￿;e) ￿ 0 for ￿ 2
￿
~ ￿;￿
￿
: Obviously it is also true that Fe (￿;e) = 0 and Fee (￿;e) = 0 for
￿ 2
n
￿;~ ￿;￿
o
:
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that s = ￿￿1 (￿;e) is the signal that generates the conditional
expectation ￿ = ￿ (s;e): So, the probability that the conditional expectation is smaller or equal to
￿ is
F (￿;e) = ￿￿1 (￿;e)
because the distribution of s is uniform. Hence, the density of ￿ is
f (￿;e) = ￿
￿1
￿ (￿;e) =
1
￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e)
where the second equality uses the inverse function theorem. By the assumption that Hs (￿js;e) <
0; we have ￿s (s;e) > 0: Boundedness of Hs (￿js;e) implies that ￿s (s;e) < 1; and so f (￿;e) > 0
for all ￿:
The inverse hazard rate becomes
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
= ￿￿1 (￿;e)￿s
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ I obtain
@
@￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
=
￿s
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e)
+ ￿￿1 (￿;e)
￿ss
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e)
= 1 + ￿￿1 (￿;e)
￿ss
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e)
Thus,
@
@￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ 0 , 1 +
s￿ss (s;e)
￿s (s;e)
￿ 0
Di⁄erentiating once more, I have
@2
@￿
2
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
=
￿ss
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
(￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e))
2 + ￿￿1 (￿;e)
￿sss
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
￿s
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
￿
￿
￿ss
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿￿2
(￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e))
3
=
1
￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e)
@
@s
 
s
￿ss
￿
￿￿1 (￿;e);e
￿
￿s (￿￿1 (￿;e);e)
!
which establishes the desired result.
Examples. Recall the structure of the example: ￿ (s;e) = B + 1
3 (a + bx(s) + ey (s)): The
following statements are true:
i) ￿s (s;e) > 0 , bxs (s) + eys (s) > 0;
ii) ￿s (s;e) + s￿ss (s;e) > 0 , b[xs (s) + sxss (s)] + e[ys (s) + syss (s)] > 0;
31iii) @
@s
h
s￿ss(s;e)
￿s(s;e)
i
￿ 0 , [￿ss (s;e) + s￿sss (s;e)]￿s (s;e) ￿ s(￿ss (s;e))
2 ￿ 0 ,
[b(xss (s) + sxsss (s)) + e(yss (s) + sysss (s))][bxs (s) + eys (s)] ￿ s(bxss (s) + eyss (s))
2 ￿ 0
The idea in the following examples is that for e small enough, properties i through iii depend
crucially on x(s):
Example I: x(s) = 9
5 ￿ 1
5 (s ￿ 3)
2 : Since xs (s) = 2
5 (3 ￿ s) > 0; for e small enough property i holds.
xs (s) + sxss (s) = 6
5 ￿ 4
5s > 0; so property ii holds for e small enough. Since xss (s) = ￿2
5 < 0; I
have @
@s
h
s￿ss(s;e)
￿s(s;e)
i
￿ 0 for e small enough.
Example II: x(s) = ￿81
19 + 1
19 (s + 9)
2 : xs (s) = 2
19 (s + 9) > 0; so property one is satis￿ed for e
small; since xss (s) = 2
19 > 0 property ii is satis￿ed for small e; To see that property @
@s
h
s￿ss(s;e)
￿s(s;e)
i
￿
0 holds in this example, consider ￿rst the case where e = 0 (for this speci￿c example). In that case
@
@s
h
s￿ss(s;e)
￿s(s;e)
i
> 0 if
b(xss (s))bxs (s) ￿ s(bxss (s))
2 > 0 , b2 4
361
(s + 9) ￿ b2s
4
361
> 0
Obviously this condition holds. By continuity, for e small enough @
@s
h
s￿ss(s;e)
￿s(s;e)
i
￿ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. e = 0 is optimal for the agent if and only if q(￿) = q for all ￿ and
t ￿ ￿q ￿ 0 for all ￿: The best such contract from the principal￿ s perspective solves
max
q;t
Z ￿
￿
(V (q) ￿ t)dF (￿;e)
s:t: t ￿ ￿q ￿ 0
The optimal contract in this class satis￿es
Vq (q)jq=^ q = ￿
and ^ t = ￿^ q: This contract is very costly to the principal, because he pays the agent always as if
this one had the highest possible cost. Suppose instead the principal o⁄ers the contract
qBM (￿;e) = V ￿1
q
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
(29)
This contract corresponds to the case where the principal neglects his in￿ uence on the agent￿ s e⁄ort
choice but o⁄ers a contract which elicits information truthfully. For simplicity in this argument
we assume that ￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) is non-decreasing in ￿; however this is not essential. Even with some
bunching, the principal manages to get some share from the surplus. And since the principal
extracts some rents, this contract dominates the contract
￿
^ t; ^ q
￿
:
I now prove that there exist e⁄ort levels such that the principal￿ s contract o⁄er is a best reply
to the agent￿ s choice of e⁄ort and the agent￿ s choice of e⁄ort is consistent with the contract o⁄ered;
32that is, in addition to (29); it must also be true that
Z ￿ ￿
￿
Fe (￿; ^ e)qBM (￿;e)d￿ ￿ ge (^ e)
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
^ e=e
= 0 (30)
Consider the agent￿ s utility as a function of ^ e and e :
Z ￿ ￿
￿
F (￿; ^ e)qBM (￿;e)d￿ ￿ g (^ e)
Under our assumptions, qBM (￿;e) is di⁄erentiable in e: Hence, the agent￿ s utility is continuous in
e and ^ e and strictly concave in ^ e: By the theorem of the maximum, the maximizer correspondence
of the agent￿ s utility function with respect to ^ e is upper hemicontinuous. By strict concavity in ^ e;
the maximizer correspondence is in fact a function. Since a single valued correspondence is upper
hemicontinuous if and only if it is continuous as a function, it follows that the maximizer of the
agent￿ s utility function is a continuous function of the principal￿ s conjectured e⁄ort level. Formally,
let ^ e = r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
denote the agent￿ s optimal choice of e⁄ort when the principal o⁄ers contract
qBM (￿;e): De￿ne
￿(e) ￿
￿ Z
￿
Fe
￿
￿;r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿￿
V ￿1
q
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
d￿ ￿ ge
￿
r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿￿
(31)
An equilibrium e⁄ort (that satis￿es both (29) and (30)) is then de￿ned as a solution to the equation
￿(e) = 0; or, equivalently, as ￿xed point satisfying e = r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
:
Such a ￿xed point must exist, because I have r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿￿
￿
e=0 > 0 and r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿￿
￿
e=e < e:
To see the ￿rst point, notice that the family of distributions has a monotone inverse hazard rate
for all e: Therefore, qBM (￿;0) is a strictly monotonic contract, and the agent has a strictly positive
incentive to acquire information. To see the second point, notice that the marginal cost of e⁄ort
goes to in￿nity as e approaches e: Since r
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
is a continuous function, it must have a
￿xed point by Brouwer￿ s ￿xed point theorem.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is split into two parts. In the ￿rst part, I show that the
multiplier ￿ is negative for e < ~ e and that ￿ is positive for e > ~ e: In the second part, I give su¢ cient
conditions for a small increase in the e⁄ort level to be bene￿cial (detrimental, respectively) to the
principal around ￿ = 0:
Part i) If e < e￿ then ￿ < 0; if e > e￿ then ￿ > 0:
By the de￿nition of the smallest ￿xed point, we know thatr
￿
qBM (￿;e)
￿
> e for e < ~ e: To make
sure that the agent indeed chooses e; the principal must reduce the agent￿ s incentive to acquire
33information. This is achieved by reducing production for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ and increasing production for
￿ ￿ ~ ￿: From the condition of optimality,
Vq (q (￿)) = ￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
we conclude that ￿ < 0 since Fe (￿;e) ￿ 0 for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ and Fe (￿;e) ￿ 0 for ￿ > ~ ￿: The proof for e > ~ e
is analogous and therefore omitted.
Part ii) The marginal e⁄ect of a small increase in e around a point where ￿ = 0 :
Let
W (e) ￿ max
q(￿)
8
> <
> :
R ￿ ￿
￿
￿
V (q (￿)) ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
q (￿)
￿
f (￿;e)d￿
+￿
￿R ￿ ￿
￿ Fe (￿;e)q (￿)d￿ ￿ ge (e)
￿
9
> =
> ;
Invoking the envelope theorem I have around a point where ￿ = 0
We (e) =
Z ￿ ￿
￿
 
V (q (￿)) ￿
 
￿q (￿) +
Z ￿
￿
q(￿)d￿
!!
fe (￿;e)d￿
Integrating by parts, and noting that Fe (￿;e) = Fe
￿￿ ￿;e
￿
= 0; I can write
We (e) = ￿
Z ￿ ￿
￿
(Vq (q (￿)) ￿ ￿)q￿ (￿)Fe (￿;e)d￿
Substituting for q￿ (￿) =
@
@￿(￿+
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e))
Vqq(q(￿)) ; for
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) = Vq (q (￿)) ￿ ￿; and multiplying by
Vq(q(￿))
￿+
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
= 1
I obtain
We (e) = ￿
Z ￿ ￿
￿
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
Vqq (q (￿))
Vq (q (￿))
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
@
@￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿
Recall that ￿(q) =
￿Vqq(q)
Vq(q) so that
Vq(q)
￿Vqq(q) = 1
￿(q) and let ￿(q) = ￿ 1
￿(q): Then, recollecting terms,
I can write
We (e) = ￿
Z ￿ ￿
￿
0
@￿(q (￿))
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
@
@￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
1
AFe (￿;e)d￿
after another integration by parts, using the fact that
R ￿
￿ Fe (￿;e)d￿ = 0 for ￿ = ￿ and for ￿ = ￿ ￿; I
have
We (e) =
Z ￿ ￿
￿
0
@
Z ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿
@
@￿
2
4￿(q (￿))
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
@
@￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿3
5
1
Ad￿
Notice that
R ￿
￿ Fe (￿;e)d￿ ￿ 0 by proposition 2. Thus, to prove the result, it su¢ ces to sign the
expression @
@￿ [￿]. De￿ne
X (￿) ￿ ￿(q (￿))
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
@
@￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
34Performing the di⁄erentiation, I have
X￿ (￿) = ￿q (q (￿))q￿ (￿)
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
@
@￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
+￿(q (￿))
￿ @
@￿
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) ￿
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿2
@
@￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
+￿(q (￿))
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
@2
@￿
2
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
To sign, these expressions, notice that convexity (concavity, respectively) of the inverse hazard rate
is equivalent to
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) ￿ (￿)(￿ ￿ ￿) @
@￿
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e): Convexity of the inverse hazard rate implies that
￿
@
@￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ ￿
@
@￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ 0
Concavity of the inverse hazard rate implies that
￿
@
@￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿ ￿
@
@￿
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
Note ￿nally that ￿q (q) =
￿q(q)
(￿(q))2, which implies that sign
￿
￿q (q)
￿
= sign
￿
￿q (q)
￿
and recall that
by de￿nition ￿(q (￿)) ￿ 0: Then it is now easy to see ￿q (q) ￿ 0, together with a convex inverse
hazard rate implies that that X￿ (￿) ￿ 0:
Result ii) follows from observing that the ￿rst and last terms on the right-hand side of X￿ (￿)
change sign for ￿q (q) ￿ 0 and a concave inverse hazard rate, and that the middle term becomes
smaller as ￿ is decreased.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the cost function is changed to ^ g (e) = g (e) + ￿g (e) where ￿
is a parameter that takes values in the interval [￿￿;￿], and where ￿ < 1: Notice that the function
^ g (e) is an Inada cost function for any such ￿, and an interior solution is guaranteed. The marginal
cost to the agent of exerting e⁄ort e is now ^ ge (e) = ge (e) + ￿ge (e): The multiplier ￿ is equal to
the change in the principal￿ s utility due to a change in ￿ge (e): Since e is a constant, I can de￿ne
c(￿) ￿ ￿ge (e): Let W (c) denote the welfare of the principal as a function of c
W (c) = max
q(￿)
Z ￿ ￿
￿
￿
V (q (￿)) ￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
q (￿)
￿
f (￿;e)d￿
+￿
 Z ￿ ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e)q (￿)d￿ ￿ ge (e) ￿ c
!
and let q￿ (￿) denote the optimal quantity schedule for c = 0: Finally, let W (0) denote the value
of welfare for c = 0 (that is, ￿ = 0): From the envelope theorem, I have
Wc (c) = ￿￿
35I now provide bounds on the multiplier. I distinguish two cases, a) ￿ > 0 and b) ￿ < 0: Since
c(￿) ? 0 i⁄ ￿ ? 0 I directly state my results in terms of c:
Case a): If c > 0; then the principal must do at least as well as under the following contract.
Let q (￿) denote the optimal production schedule for c = 0 then the principal can o⁄er the contract
where
^ q (￿) = q￿ (￿) + "
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
Notice that by construction the expected level of production under the schedules ^ q (￿) and q￿ (￿)
are the same, since
￿ Z
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿ =
￿ Z
￿
Fe (￿;e)d￿ = 0: However; the schedule ^ q (￿) has more
variance than the schedule q￿ (￿): " is de￿ned by the agent￿ s ￿rst-order condition with respect to e
￿ Z
￿
Fe (￿;e)
￿
q￿ (￿) + "
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
d￿ = ge (e) + c (32)
Using
￿ Z
￿
Fe (￿;e)q￿ (￿)d￿ = ge (e)
and
￿ Z
￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
f (￿;e)d￿ = 0
I can solve (32) for ":
" =
c
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ (33)
The welfare of the principal satis￿es
W (c) ￿
￿ Z
￿
￿
V
￿
q￿ (￿) + "
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
q￿ (￿) + "
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
f (￿;e)d￿
￿
￿ Z
￿
￿
V (q￿ (￿)) ￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
q￿ (￿) + "
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
f (￿;e)d￿
= W (0) ￿ "
￿ Z
￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
f (￿;e)d￿
where the ￿rst inequality is due to the de￿nition of W (c) and the second inequality uses the fact
that q￿ (￿) + "
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) is a mean-preserving spread of q￿ (￿) and that V (￿) is concave. Since
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
has mean zero, the integral in the last line is just equal to the covariance between ￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e) and
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) : Thus,
W (c) ￿ W (0) ￿ ￿"Cov
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
;
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
36Substituting for the value of " from (33); I have
W (c) ￿ W (0) ￿ ￿c
Cov
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e);
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Dividing and taking limits as c ! 0 I have
lim
c!0
W (c) ￿ W (0)
c
= ￿￿ ￿ ￿
Cov
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e);
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Thus,
￿ ￿
Cov
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e);
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
From a standard result, Cov
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e);
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
r
V ar
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿r
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
: Hence,
￿ ￿
r
V ar
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
r
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ (34)
Case b) c < 0: In this case, the principal can do at least as well as by o⁄ering the contract
^ q (￿) =
8
> <
> :
q (￿) for ￿ < ~ ￿
q (￿) + "
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
" is again de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition for e⁄ort
"
￿ Z
~ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
d￿ = ￿c
Solving for "; I can write
￿" =
c
￿
1 ￿ F
￿
~ ￿;e
￿￿h
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
+ E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿i
Notice that " < 0: I have
W (c) ￿
￿ Z
￿
￿
V
￿
q (￿) + 1￿￿~ ￿"
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
q (￿) + 1￿￿~ ￿"
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
f (￿;e)d￿
￿
￿ Z
￿
￿
V (q (￿)) ￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
q (￿) + 1￿￿~ ￿"
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿￿
f (￿;e)d￿
= W (0) ￿ "
￿ Z
~ ￿
￿
￿ +
F (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
f (￿;e)d￿
37where the ￿rst inequality uses the de￿nition of W (c); the second uses the fact that "
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) is
non-negative for ￿ ￿ ~ ￿; so the principal￿ s utility is at least as high as when he does not consume
the additional quantity at all. Substituting from the agent￿ s ￿rst-order condition for " I can write
W (c) ￿ W (0) ￿ c
￿ Z
~ ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) d￿
Dividing by c < 0 I have
W (c) ￿ W (0)
c
￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) d￿
Rewriting the left-hand side, I can state that
W (0) ￿ W (c)
￿c
￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) d￿
Taking limits as c goes to zero, I obtain the left-side di⁄erential of W with respect to c: Thus,
lim
c!0
W (0) ￿ W (c)
￿c
= ￿￿ ￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) d￿
and hence
￿￿ ￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) f (￿;e)d￿
￿ Z
~ ￿
Fe (￿;e)
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e) d￿
The integral in the numerator can be written as
￿
1 ￿ F
￿
~ ￿;e
￿￿
2
6
4
Cov
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e);
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
+E
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
3
7
5
38while the integral in the denominator can be written as
￿
1 ￿ F
￿
~ ￿;e
￿￿￿
V ar
￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
+ E
￿
Fe (￿;e)
f (￿;e)
￿
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿￿
where the expectations are taken with respect to the random variable ￿: The ratio of the two
terms satis￿es
Cov
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e);
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
+ E
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
+ E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
￿
r
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿r
V ar
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
+ E
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
+ E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿2
￿
r
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿r
V ar
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
+ E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿2
￿
r
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿
￿r
V ar
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
where the ￿rst inequality uses again the fact that Cov (A;B) ￿
p
V ar(A)
p
V ar(B); the second
inequality uses the observation that E
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ~ ￿
￿
< 0; and the third is trivial. It follows that
I have
￿￿ ￿
r
V ar
￿
￿ +
F(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
r
V ar
￿
Fe(￿;e)
f(￿;e)
￿
￿
￿￿
￿
Proof of Result 1. The agent￿ s ex ante expected utility can be written
￿(e) Z
￿(e)
max
8
> <
> :
0;
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
9
> =
> ;
dF (￿;e)
There are three cases to consider: i) ￿ < ￿(e) and ￿(e) < ￿ (corresponding to an actual e⁄ort level
that is lower than the one that the principal wishes to implement); ii) ￿(e) < ￿ and ￿ < ￿(e); and
iii) ￿(e) = ￿ and ￿ = ￿(e):
Case iii) corresponds to the case that I have already analyzed in the main model; so I disregard
this case here.
39i) In this case,
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ ￿ 0 for all ￿(e) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(e) and therefore I have
￿(e) Z
￿(e)
max
8
> <
> :
0;
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
9
> =
> ;
dF (￿;e) =
￿(e) Z
￿(e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) (35)
Since
dF(￿;e)
d￿ = 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿(e) and ￿(e) < ￿ ￿ ￿; it is true that
￿(e) Z
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) +
￿ Z
￿(e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) = 0
But then, (35) is equivalent to
￿(e) Z
￿(e)
max
8
> <
> :
0;
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
9
> =
> ;
dF (￿;e) =
￿ Z
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e)
Finally, after an integration by parts,
￿ Z
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) = F
￿
￿;e
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ ￿ F (￿;e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ +
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)F (￿;e)d￿
=
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)F (￿;e)d￿
where the ￿nal equality uses the fact that F (￿;e) = 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿(e); and hence F (￿;e) = 0:
Case ii) In this case, I can write
￿(e) Z
￿(e)
max
8
> <
> :
0;
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
9
> =
> ;
dF (￿;e) = F (￿;e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ +
￿ Z
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) (36)
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (36) is computed using the fact that
￿ Z
￿(e)
max
8
> <
> :
0;
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
9
> =
> ;
dF (￿;e) =
￿ Z
￿(e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) = F (￿;e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
Since the lowest type the agent can announce is ￿; he will always do so when ￿(e) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: On the
other hand, if ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿(e); the agent rejects the contract, since
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ < 0 over this range.
40Finally, again after an integration by parts, I can write
F (￿;e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ +
￿ Z
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿dF (￿;e) = F (￿;e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ + F
￿
￿;e
￿
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿
￿F (￿;e)
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)d￿ +
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)F (￿;e)d￿
=
￿ Z
￿
q (￿)F (￿;e)d￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Since F (￿(e);e) = 0 for all e; I can di⁄erentiate totally and
have f (￿(e);e)￿e (e) + Fe (￿(e);e) = 0: At ￿(e) = ￿; I have Fe (￿;e) = ￿f (￿;e)￿e (e) > 0 since
￿e (e) < 0: Therefore, for a contract that implements a high e⁄ort level (￿ > 0), production at the
top is going to be unusually high. A similar argument can be used to show that production at the
bottom is smaller than the Baron Myerson quantity for the case where ￿ > 0:
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is split into two parts. In part i I derive the properties
of the conditional expectation function. In part ii I use these properties to derive those of the ex
ante distribution of ￿:
Part i: Properties of the conditional expectation function
From Milgrom (1981) it follows directly that @
@￿
hi(￿js;i)
h(￿js;i) > 0 for s 2 (~ s;s) implies Hi (￿js;i) < 0
for s 2 (~ s;s): Likewise, @
@￿
hi(￿js;i)
h(￿js;i) < 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) implies Hi (￿js;i) > 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s): Since
￿i (s;i) = ￿
￿ Z
￿
Hi (￿js;i)d￿
this proves that
￿i (s;i) < 0 for s 2 (s; ~ s) and ￿i (s;i) > 0 for s 2 (~ s;s)
Finally, I show that ￿i (s;i) = 0 for s 2 fs; ~ s;sg: To see this, note that one can write for s 2 fs; ~ s;sg
@
@￿
hi (￿js;i)
h(￿js;i)
H (￿js;i) = 0
Integrating I have
￿ Z
￿
@
@￿
hi (￿js;i)
h(￿js;i)
H (￿js;i)d￿ = 0
41Integrating by parts, I obtain
he
￿
￿
￿
￿s;i
￿
h
￿
￿
￿
￿s;i
￿ ￿
￿ Z
￿
hi (￿js;i)
h(￿js;i)
h(￿js;i)d￿ = 0
Since h(￿js;i) is a density for all i; I have
￿ Z
￿
hi (￿js;i)d￿ = 0: It follows that
hi(￿js;i)
h(￿js;i) = 0: From
@
@￿
hi(￿js;i)
h(￿js;i) = 0; it follows that
hi(￿js;i)
h(￿js;i) = 0: Finally, from the fact that h(￿js;i) > 0 for all ￿ it
follows that hi (￿js;i) = 0 for all ￿: Hence, for s 2 fs; ~ s;sg ￿ (s;i) is independent of i:
Part ii: Properties of F (￿;e) :
Since l(i;e) has full support for all e; the distribution of ￿ has a nonmoving support F (￿;e) =
08e and F
￿
￿;e
￿
= 18e. Hence Fe (￿;e) = Fe
￿
￿;e
￿
= 0. By the law of iterated expectations E￿￿ =
E￿￿ for all e: Since
R ￿
￿ ￿dF (￿;e) = ￿ ￿
R ￿
￿ F (￿;e)d￿; this is equivalent to
R ￿
￿ Fe (￿;e)d￿ = 08e:
By an integration by parts
F (￿;e) =
Z 1
0
Fi (￿;i)dL(i;e)
= Fi (￿;i)L(i;e)j
1
0 ￿
Z 1
0
￿
￿1
i (￿;i)L(i;e)di
since Fi (￿;i) is locally constant for ￿ = 2 [￿ (s;i);￿ (s;i)]: Taking derivatives with respect to e; since
L(1;e) = 18e; I have
Fe (￿;e) = ￿
Z 1
0
￿
￿1
i (￿;i)Le (i;e)di
From part i, I have
￿i (￿;i) T 0 , ￿ S ~ ￿
and hence
Fe (￿;e) > 0for￿ 2
￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
Fe (￿;e) < 0for￿ 2
￿
~ ￿;￿
￿
Since Lee (i;e) and Le (i;e) have opposing signs for all i; I have also
Fee (￿;e) < 0for￿ 2
￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
Fee (￿;e) > 0for￿ 2
￿
~ ￿;￿
￿
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